

# Firm Sorting and Agglomeration

Gaubert (2018)

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What is the impact of an increase in city size in terms of firm value added and firm employment changes?

- Elasticities are positive in a great share of sectors
- For value added, it is positive for 85% of industries, corresponding to 93% of firms. Significantly negative for only one industry.
- The elasticity of employment to city size almost always lies below the elasticity of value added to city size

Does city size impact the share of inputs used in production?

- Larger cities host more capital intensive production<sup>1</sup>
- Even controlling for local skill intensity and export activities.

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<sup>1</sup>Cobb-Douglas production, with local labor, tradable and non-tradable capital.

## Who benefits from agglomeration externalities?

- Firms located in large cities benefit disproportionately from agglomeration externalities, Combes et al. (2012)
- More efficient firms self-select into larger cities (looking at the moves of mono-plant firms across cities and relying on a residual approach)
- Firm-size distribution is more fat-tailed for industries located in larger cities (lower Pareto exponent)

## The *Urban productivity premium*

- **First and Second natural advantage**,  
"Nature's unfairness is not easily remedied", Cronon (1991)
- **Agglomeration economies**: learning, matching, sharing, spillovers,  
Productivity gains from non-market interactions within cities
- **Sorting**: (self-selection of the more productive firm into larger cities)  
Spatial wage disparities remain between 'equivalent' workers,  
Combes et al. (2008)
- **Selection**: Large cities tend to select more productive agents
- **City size distribution**: Zipf, Gibrat, Stability...

## Main Takeaways of this session

- More efficient firms locate in larger cities: sorting matters!
- Ingredients and results in labor geography:
  - ▶ spatial segmentation distorts nation-wide policies through local spillovers,
  - ▶ more productive labor demand is in larger cities, with more capital intensive production
- Policy recommendation
  - ▶ Supporting the growth of cities has better welfare implication than subsidizing the implementation of firms in smaller cities
- Next Challenges: Identifying the local factors of growth
  - ▶ Beyond size composition may matters
  - ▶ as Space: City networks, Distances and Large scale commuting
  - ▶ Dynamic system of cities

## Sorting, selection, and agglomeration, Behrens et al. (2014)

- Individual are characterized by their 'talent'  $t$  and 'serendipity'  $s$ , which yields their 'productivity'  $\varphi \equiv t \times s$ .
- There is a continuum of *ex ante* homogeneous sites where people form *endogenous* cities  $i$ . Their size  $L$  fully characterize cities.
- Following Lucas' model (1978), there is city-specific selection cut-offs to be entrepreneur  $\varphi_c(i)$ .
- Goods are non-tradable and produced in varieties  $x_c(i) = \varphi_c(i)l_c(i)$

## **Sorting, selection, and agglomeration**, Behrens et al. (2014)

- People choose cities according to their talent, increasing with size  $L$ : **sorting**.
- Then they draw a random and individual level of serendipity  $s$ , which determines their own productivity  $\varphi$  as the local cut-off  $\varphi_c(i)$ , increasing in size, to establish a business: **selection**.
- Which ends up by producing more varieties in larger cities: **agglomeration economies**

Conclusion:

- Elasticity of earnings with respect to city population is 8.2%
- Explained simultaneously by sorting, selection and agglomeration



## **Firm Sorting and Agglomeration**, Gaubert (2018)

How much of the productivity advantage of a region is shaped by the efficiency of the firms it attracts?

### *Objective:*

- Building a theory of firm location choice, with a variety of sector
- Disentangling firm 'raw' productivity and agglomeration externalities
- Assessing the general equilibrium effect of place-based policies

## Firm Sorting and Agglomeration, Gaubert (2018)

### *Results:*

- More efficient firms locate in larger cities
- Sectoral firm size distribution is more fat-tailed for industries located in large cities.
- Sorting accounts for 1/2 of the productivity advantage of large cities; with an elasticity of observed firm productivity to city size of 2.3%, compared to a total estimated at 4%
- Supporting the growth of cities has better welfare implication than subsidizing the implementation of firms in smaller cities

## *Cities*

- Constraint in land supply
- Fully characterized by their size
- Atomistic landowners construct housing,  $h^{\text{Prod}}$ , using land  $\gamma$ , with local labor  $l_h$ , according to the housing production function:

$$h^{\text{Prod}} = \gamma^b \left( \frac{l_h}{1-b} \right)^{1-b}$$

- Housing price  $p_H(L)$  and local wage  $w(L)$  are given in competitive local markets.

## Workers

- Utility

$$U = \left(\frac{c}{\eta}\right)^\eta \left(\frac{h}{1-\eta}\right)^{1-\eta}$$

- with  $c = \prod_{j=1}^{j=S} c_j^{\xi_j}$  the Cobb-Douglas bundle of goods across  $S$  sectors
- CES bundle of varieties within sector  $c_j = \left[\int c_j(i)^{\frac{\sigma_j-1}{\sigma_j}} di\right]^{\frac{\sigma_j}{\sigma_j-1}}$

## Workers

- Workers are freely mobile, they follow firms location choice
- The budget constraint faced by workers is  $P_C(L) + p_H(l)h(L) = w(L)$
- Housing consumed by each workers in equilibrium in city  $L$  is  $h(L) = (1 - \eta)^{1-b} L^{-b}$
- Workers wage is  $w(L) = \bar{w}((1 - \eta)L)^{b\frac{1-\eta}{\eta}}$

=> Utility equalized across localisation in equilibrium

=> Workers' wage increases with city size, but city population also increases congestion: higher housing prices

## *Firms*

- Firms are engaged in monopolistic competition
  - Heterogeneous firms with 'raw' productivity  $z$  and sector  $j$  (with capital intensity  $\alpha_j$  and specific benefit from local externalities  $\sigma_j$ )
  - Varieties are produced by firm from different sectors  $j$ , using (non-tradable) labor  $l$  and (tradable) capital  $k$  inputs in a Cobb-Douglas production function:  $y_j(z, L) = \psi(z, L, s_j)k^{\alpha_j}l^{1-\alpha_j}$
  - $\psi(z, L, s_j)$  is a firm-specific Hicks-neutral productivity shifter. A choice of a classic productivity shifter is of the form  $\psi = zL^s$
- $\Rightarrow$  The sorting assumption lies in the complementarity between intrinsic productivity and local externalities:  $\psi(z, L, s_j)$

## Set up

- Firm discover their raw productivity  $z$  (draw from some distribution  $F_j$ ) and chose a city size where to produce
- No *entry selection*, such as Melitz (2003), but a *selection on city size*
- Firms set constant markups over their marginal cost
- City developers built cities on an infinite set of potential sites
- The heterogeneity across cities will results from firm sorting and city size (different from Behrens et al., 2014), varying with sectors.

## Firms in this set up

- Firm  $z$ 's profit<sup>2</sup> is  $\pi_j(z, L) = \kappa_{1j} \left( \frac{\psi(z, L, s_j)}{w(L)^{1-j}} \right)^{\sigma_j - 1} R_j P_j^{\sigma_j - 1}$
- Firm employment in city size  $L$  is  $l_j(z, L) = (1 - \alpha_j)(\sigma_j - 1) \frac{\pi_j(z, L)}{w(L)}$
- The problem of the firm is thus to choose the city size  $L$  that maximize its profits  $\pi_j(z, L)$ :

$$L_j^*(z) = \operatorname{argmax}_{L \in \mathcal{L}} \{ \pi_j(z, L) \}$$

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<sup>2</sup> $\kappa_{1j} = ((\sigma_j - 1)\alpha_j^{\alpha_j}(1 - \alpha_j)^{1 - \alpha_j}(P)^{-\alpha_j})^{\sigma_j - 1} / \sigma_j^{\sigma_j}$



## Assumption and Properties (I)

- Properties of monotone comparative statics (Topkis, 1998), and assuming log-supermodularity of the productivity shifter, yields a matching scheme that is non-decreasing in  $z$ .
- and fully determined the firm maximization problem and optimal values of firm  $z$ 's profit, revenues and employment; conditional on the set of city size  $\mathcal{L}$ .

## Assumption and Properties (II)

- The *geographic distribution* (def.) is the probability for a firm from sector  $(\alpha_j, \sigma_j)$  to choose to locate in a city of size smaller than  $L$
- The *geographic distribution* of firms of a high  $\alpha_j$  sector first-order stochastically dominates that of a lower  $\alpha_k$  sector, all else equal.
- The same holds for high  $\sigma_j$  sector (benefit from agglomeration externalities) compared to a lower  $\sigma_k$  sector.
- In addition if  $(\alpha_j, \sigma_j) \geq (\alpha_k, \sigma_k)$  the tail of the firm-size distribution from sector  $j$  is thicker than the tail of the firm-size distribution in sector  $k$  :  $\zeta_j \leq \zeta_k$ .

## City Developers to close the model

- Equilibrium device allows to create new city, where agents may locate
- City developers subsidizing firms' profit  $T_j(L)$  and perfectly compete across cities, so that they maximize:

$$\max_{\{T_j(L)\}_{j \in 1, \dots, S}} \Pi_L = b(1 - \eta)Lw(L) - \sum_{j=1}^S \int_z T_j(L) \pi_j(z, L) 1_L(z, j) dF_j(z)$$

- The first term corresponds to housing revenue, the second term to subsidies cost
- Solving the problem results in subsidies independent of city size

## A system of Cities: Definition of the Equilibrium

- The equilibrium is a set of cities  $\mathcal{L}$  characterized by a city-size distribution  $f_L$ , and for each sector  $j = 1, \dots, S$  a location function  $L_j(z)$ , an employment function  $l_j(z)$  and also a wage schedule  $w(L)$ , a housing-price  $p_H(L)$ , a capital-use function  $k_j(z)$ , a production function  $y_j(z)$ , a price index  $P_j$ , and a mass of firms  $M_j$

$\Rightarrow$  The equilibrium of this economy exists and is unique

## Solving the model in 4 steps:

- Equilibrium subsidy between city, with city developers zero profit condition, to find  $T_j^* = \frac{b(1-\eta)(1-\alpha_j)(\sigma_j-1)}{1-(1-\eta)(a-b)}$
- Firms match with city size,  $L_j^{**}(z) = \operatorname{argmax}_{L \geq 0} \pi_j^*(z, L)$
- General equilibrium quantities,  $R, P_j, M_j$
- City-size distribution, this yields<sup>3</sup>

$$f_L(L) = \kappa_4 \frac{\sum_{j=1}^S M_j 1_L(j) l_j(z_j^*(L)) (f_j(z_j^*(L)) \frac{dz_j^*(L)}{dL}}{L}$$

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<sup>3</sup>  $\kappa_4 = \frac{1}{1-(1-\eta)(1-b)}$

## Theoretical conclusion

- Under reasonable hypothesis **the model yields a unique equilibrium** of the economy, that provides a system of cities and a **matching scheme between firm  $(j, z)$  and city  $(L)$** .
- More productive firms locate in larger cities, thanks to the log-supermodularity of the firm-specific productivity shifter  $\psi(z, L, s_j)$
- **Sectors that are more capital intensive  $(\alpha_j)$  are more likely to locate in larger cities** (stochastic dominance)
- **Sectors that benefit the most from agglomeration externalities  $(\sigma_j)$  are more likely to locate in larger cities**
- In addition if  $(\alpha_j, \sigma_j) \geq (\alpha_k, \sigma_k)$  implies thicker tail of the firm-size distribution from sector  $j$  compared to  $k$  ( $\zeta_j \leq \zeta_k$ ).

## French firm-level **data and localization** (with the CASD)

- Information on firms comes from FICUS/FARE data set, and plant-firm information from DADS allow to localize the production.
- City are defined according to the commuting zones (*Zones d'emploi*)
- City size corresponds to the total local employment of the area
- Focus only on firms in the tradable production sectors in year 2000, 157,070 firms, covering 23 sectors, as in Combes et al. (2012)

## Structural estimation

- The model is estimated industry by industry
- The estimation is made by minimizing the distance between moments of the data and their simulated counterparts to estimate the sectoral parameters<sup>4</sup>:  $(\alpha_j, \sigma_j, \nu_{z,j}, \nu_{R,j})$

$$\|m_j - \hat{m}_j(\theta)\|_{W_j^2} = (m_j - \hat{m}_j(\theta))' W_j (m_j - \hat{m}_j(\theta))$$

- Weights are, for each sectors, the generalized inverse of the estimated variance-covariance matrix  $\Omega_j$  of the moments, calculated from the data  $m_j$

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<sup>4</sup> $\alpha_j$ : capital intensity;  $\sigma_j$ : complementarity in  $\psi$ ;  $\nu_{z,j}$ : the variance of  $z$  and  $\nu_{R,j}$  the variance of an additional parameter  $\epsilon_{i,L}$  (error term), described later.



## Structural estimation

- An error structure is introduced by an idiosyncratic motive for choosing a specific location<sup>5</sup>,  $\epsilon_{i,L}$ , with variance  $\nu_{R,j}$
- The productivity shifter is chosen, such as to fit the criteria of the previous solving (especially log-supermodularity)

$$\log(\psi_j(z_i, L, s_j, \alpha_j)) = \alpha_j \log(L) + \log(z_i) \left(1 + \log\left(\frac{L}{L_0}\right)\right)^{s_j} + \epsilon_{i,L}$$

if  $\log(z_i) \geq 0, L_0$ ; if not  $\log(\psi_j(z_i, L, s_j, \alpha_j)) = 0$

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<sup>5</sup>This will be used later to disentangle the agglomeration impact in the identification.

## Structural estimation: **two steps**

- First estimating  $\alpha_j$  and  $\sigma_j$ , then  $b\frac{1-\eta}{\eta}$ , equal to the elasticity of wages to city size in the model and the Cobb-Douglas share of each industry  $\xi_j$  by measuring its share of value-added produced.
- Secondly, backing out the quadruple  $(\alpha_j, \sigma_j, \nu_{z,j}, \nu_{R,j})$  for each sectors  $j$ , comes from the firms discrete choice of (normalized) city size:

$$\log(\tilde{L}_j^*(z_i)) = \operatorname{argmax}_{\log(\tilde{L}) \in \mathcal{L}} \log(z_i) (1 + \log \tilde{L})^{\sigma_j} + (a_j - b(1 - \alpha_j) \frac{1 - \eta}{\eta}) \log \tilde{L} + \epsilon_{i,L}$$

## Structural estimation: **Simulated Method of Moments**

- Unobserved heterogeneity across firms (larger firms benefit more from agglomeration externalities) and Non-linearity of the firm choice
- We require to use the simulated method (Gourieroux et al., 1996) to estimate the parameters of interest  $(\alpha, \sigma, \nu_z, \nu_R)$ , as in Eaton et al. (2011).
- Three sets of nonparametric moments:
  - ▶ Moments (quantile) of the firm value-added increase with city size, sector by sector (to pin down  $a$  and  $s$ )
  - ▶ Moments characterizing the firm size distribution in value added (for  $\nu_z$  and  $\nu_R$ ): 25th, 50th, 70th and 90th (emphasizing higher quantiles, capturing most of the value added and less noisier).
  - ▶ Moments of the distribution of sectoral value-added across city sizes (25th, 50th, 75th), help to  $\nu_z$  from  $s$  and  $a$ .

## Conclusion: **the Parameters**

- **Agglomeration externalities** per se:

- + Publishing and printing, Manufacturing of computers and office machinery, Business services and IT;
- Motor vehicles, Product of wood, except furniture

### **Complementarity:**

- + Chemical, Manufacturing of furniture, Manufacturing of medical, precision and optical instrument;
- Leather and footwear, Basic metal

### **Both:**

- + Information technology services, Manufacturing of wearing apparel

- **Limitation** to the identification of agglomeration externalities are shown when sector may also benefits from higher Market Potential in larger cities like 'Business services and IT' or 'Publishing and printing'
- Seminal contribution and comparable results in Combes et al., 2012

## Conclusion: **Analysis of the Parameters**

- The **importance of the sorting**: decomposition of the variance contributions of productivity due:
  - ▶ to sorting  $\log(z_i)(1 + \log \tilde{L})^{s_j}$
  - ▶ and the idiosyncratic part  $\epsilon_{iL}$

⇒ On average, across sectors, the systematic component (firm sorting) explains 51% of the variance of firms productivity. The remaining part is due to random location choice.

## Local Tax Incentives

(subsidizing firms locating in less develop cities)

- Forces at play:
  - + Enhancing local TFP by attracting economic activity
    - Larger cities lose some resources and activity
      - ▶ It depends on the overall reallocation of economic activity in space
- Local effects:
  - ▶ Increase city size by 4%, small because attracted firms are small and low productive.
- Aggregate effects:
  - ▶ Computing counterfactuals aggregate TFP and welfare (real income).
  - ▶ Subsidy by 1% of GDP leads to 1.05% loss in TFP, 1.4% in welfare.
  - ▶ More inequality: low productive firm from mid sized cities goes in small cities, while people goes in larger cities

## Land-use regulation

(decreasing the land-use parameter  $b$  in the housing production function)

- Direct effect on (increasing) utility: less congestion
- Flattens the wage schedule, which leads firms to locate in larger cities, enhancing productivity
- An overall increase in housing supply elasticity (from the 25th to 75th percentiles) leads to a 1.6% increase of TFP plus a 1.8% indirect gain in welfare.

## Contribution

- Firm maximizing problem depend only on city size: location choice
- Disentangling firm sorting from agglomeration externalities in the urban premium
- Place-based policy evaluation with local and aggregate impacts
- *Limits*: Static, Non-spatial, No-Unemployment and No-Composition



## What matters?

- Identifying the local factors of growth: Where are the new jobs?
- Understanding spatial disparities beyond size (composition, network)
- Building a dynamic model of cities (growth process, shuffling around)

## Zipf, Gibrat and the Dynamic of Cities

- Life cycle model of firm location (Duranton and Puga, 2001)
- Productivity shocks shuffle around spatial activity, with pretty stable locus (Michaels and Rauch, 2018)  
from handcraft to manufacturing to tech jobs (Harrigan et al., 2016);  
from North-East to the West Coast?
- Specialization: from sectoral to functional (Duranton and Puga, 2005, Charnoz et al., 2018)
- Centrality (Hsu, 2012) and City networks
- Frictional labor mobility (Schmutz and Sidibe, 2018)

## Main Takeaways

- More efficient firms locate in larger cities: **sorting matters!**
- Results in **labor geography**:
  - ▶ More productive and capital intensive jobs are in larger cities (sorting)
  - ▶ Geographic segmentation distorts nation-wide policies (local spillovers)
- **Policy recommendations**
  - ▶ Supporting the growth of cities has better welfare implication than subsidizing the implementation of firms in smaller cities
- Ideas and Challenge: Identifying the local factors of growth
  - ▶ Beyond size **composition** may matters, as..
  - ▶ **Space**: City networks, Distances and Large scale commuting
  - ▶ **Dynamic system of cities**

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